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THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA: 








In spite of strong support of the majority of Muslims in Indonesia 
to democratic system, there are small numbers of Muslim who 
reject the democratic system. To name a few, I can mention here 
some groups of Muslims who oppose the democracy, such as 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia 
(MMI) and Salafis. These groups maintain that democracy is 
against Islam, because Islam does not recognize democracy. 
Democracy as symbolized by “the power of people” contradicts 
the basic doctrine of Islam concerning the sovereignty. In Islam, 
they maintain, the power or sovereignty belongs to God only. This 
essential concept creates various consequences dealing with 
governance of the ruled. This paper discusses the views of Salafis 
in Indonesia on the democracy. Despite their resistance of 
democracy, the Salafis consider a ruler resulted from democracy is 
valid, and Muslims should obey him:  they are not allowed to 
criticize him publicly, and are not allowed to rebel against him. 
 
Keywords: Salafis, manhaj, musha>warah, democracy, ahl al-h}all 
wa al-‘aqd, kufr.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Since 1998, following the collapse of Suharto regime, Indonesia has 
increasingly become one of the largest democratic countries in the world. 
Since then, Indonesia has carried out three general elections (1999, 2004 
and 2009), which were considered as free general elections by foreign 
observers. In addition, during the Reformation era, Indonesia has made 
many reforms that support democratic system including freedom of 
expression and political reforms.   
 In spite of strong support of the majority of Muslims in Indonesia to 
democratic system, there are small numbers of Muslim who reject the 
democratic system. To name a few, I can mention here some groups of 
Muslims who oppose the democracy, such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia 
(HTI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) and Salafis. These groups 
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maintain that democracy is against Islam, because Islam does not recognize 
democracy. Democracy as symbolized by “the power of people” contradicts 
the basic doctrine of Islam concerning the sovereignty. In Islam, they 
maintain, the power or sovereignty belongs to God only. This essential 
concept creates various consequences dealing with governance of the ruled. 
This paper discusses the views of Salafis in Indonesia on the democracy. I 
will start this discussion with a brief overview on historical development of 
Salafi movement in Indonesia, followed by Salafis views of democracy. 
Discussion on the democracy will be divided into three sub-topics:  1). 
Salafis’ view on Islam as a comprehensive way of life; 2) Salafis’ view on 
democracy; and 3). Salafis’ view on obedience to ruler.  This paper will be 
ended with concluding remarks. 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
This research is basically a fieldwork study in 14 Salafi pesantrens (Islamic 
boarding schools) conducted in two periods: from mid-August 2008 to mid-
April 2009 and from mid-December 2009 to mid-September 2010. It is 
through this study that I collected data using observation and in-depth 
interviews that made up primary sources. Besides, I also used documentary 
sources in the forms of CDs and DVDs that record the Salafi’s lectures, 
leaflets and booklets. 
Based on the characteristics of this study, I used an anthropological 
approach. During my stay at these pesantrens, I observed closely all 
activities performed by santris (students) as well as participated in some 
activities, such as collective prayers in the mosque, attending religious 
lectures, attending the classrooms, and even having meals together with the 
teachers. I had an opportunity to interview with director (mudir), teachers 
(ustadhs), and administrative staffs. In addition, I also interviewed people 
surrounding pesantrens and the leaders of Muslims organizations as well. 
These organizations include Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, Persatuan 
Islam and Persatuan Umat Islam. Through this approach it is expected that 
Salafi’s responses to the concept of democracy can be portrayed accurately 
and proportionally. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A.  Salafism Definition 
To start the discussion, I would like begin with making clear distinction 
between Salafiya movement and contemporary Salafi movement. Salafiyya 
movement is a movement that calls for Islamic reformism with the return to 
the Qur’an and hadith. This movement originated in Egypt in the late 19th 
century and advocated by the three pioneers of Islamic reformism, Jamal al-
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Din al-Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Ridla.1 However, since the 
last two decades, Indonesia has witnessed the emergence of a new Salafi 
movement. This new movement concerns the purification of religious 
thought and practices with the slogan “the return to the Qur’an and hadith”. 
This movement contends that the return to these fundamental sources of 
Islam in insufficient, and hence, the Salafi movement adds the third source 
of Islamic doctrines, that is the example of the al-Salaf al-ṣālih}, the first 
three generations of Muslims.2 They call themselves as “Salafi”, meaning a 
person who follows the Salafi manhaj (the path of the Salaf). 
The emergence of the contemporary Salafi movement in Indonesia 
in the late 1980s was closely linked to the development of the religio-
political ambition of the Saudi government. Since its creation in the mid-
eighteenth century and its reconstruction in the early twentieth century, the 
Saudi state has adopted Wahhabism as the state’s model of Islam. The 
Saudi government has enjoyed Wahhabi support for social and political 
stability in the country as its ‘ulama have always issued fatwa (religious 
opinion) legitimizing the government policy. However, within the Muslim 
world, the Saudi government encountered serious challenges from Jamal 
Abdul Nasser of Egypt with his Arab Socialism in 1960s, and from the 
Shi’ism of the Iranian revolution in the late 1970s. 
Supported by the oil boom in the 1970s, the Saudi government 
attempted to export its Wahhabi Islam to the Muslim world in order to halt 
the influence of its rivals: Nasser’s Arab socialist and Shi’ism. The efforts 
included the creation of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 
1957, followed by the establishment of the Rābiṭat al-‘Ālam al-Isla>mī (RAI, 
the Muslim World League) few years later. While the first organization was 
aimed at formulating foreign policy for Muslim countries, the latter was 
intended to disseminate Saudi’s variant Islam. Through the Rabiṭa, the 
Saudi government provided large amount of money to the Muslim world for 
different purposes such as building mosques, scholarships and supporting 
preachers. It was within this effort that the Saudi government offered 
scholarships for Indonesian students to study in Saudi universities. In 
Indonesia, the scholarships were channeled through Saudi-linked 
institutions, such as the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII, or 
Dewan Dakwah) and Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (LIPIA). 
The pioneering Salafis in Indonesia were awarded scholarships by the 
Dewan Dakwah and LIPIA. 
In Indonesia, contemporary Salafis found fertile ground for their 
movement. Following the 1974 riot by university students, well known as 
                                                
1 W. Ende, “Salafiyya”, Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. 8 (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 900. 
2 See, for example, ‘Abd al-H}aki>m bin Ami>r Abdat, Lau Kaana Khairan Lasabaquunaa Ilahi (Jakarta: 
Pustaka Mu’awiyah bin Abi Sufyan, 2007); Yazi>d bin Abdul Qadir Jawas, Mulia dengan Manhaj Salaf (Bogor: 
Pustaka At-Taqwa, 2008), 55-158.   
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the Malari case, in 1978 the government promulgated a new rule concerning 
student activities on campus. The new rule, called Normalisasi Kehidupan 
Kampus/Badan Koordinasi Kampus (NKK/BKK, Normalization of Campus 
Activities/Campus Coordinating Body), restricted the political engagement 
of students.3 Responding to this new regulation, in the early 1980s some 
students turned to religious activities, particularly to discussions of Islamic 
doctrines. Starting from the Salman mosque of the Bandung Institute of 
Technology (ITB), enthusiasm to study Islam soon became widespread in 
other campuses such as the Bogor Institute of Agriculture (IPB), Bogor, 
West Java, the University of Indonesia (UI) in Jakarta, Gadjah Mada 
University (UGM) in Yogyakarta, and the University of Hasanuddin 
(Unhas) in Makassar, South Sulawesi. The activists developed the so-called 
usra (lit. family) in their recruitment and study model.4 
The Dewan Dakwah merits mention in this regard. Banned by the 
government from any political activities, the Dewan Dakwah figures, 
particularly Mohammad Natsir, took this opportunity to disseminate their 
ideas through the campuses. A.M. Luthfi, former secretary of Natsir, 
explained that the campus was the only free place from observation.5 The 
Dewan Dakwah encouraged Muslim intellectuals, notably Imamuddin 
Abdul Rahim, Ahmad Sadili and Nukman, to hold the Latihan Mujahid 
Dakwah (LMD, Training for Preachers) at ITB, inviting student activists 
from other campuses. LMD was a special training for preachers, in which 
students were trained in a comprehensive Islam (Islam kāffa) in which 
Islam is perceived not only as a doctrine of worship but also as a doctrine of 
society, economics and politics.6 These activists later developed similar 
programs in their own campuses.  
In 1980s, Muslims observed the swing of the political pendulum of 
the New Order regime. In the first half of the decade, Suharto proposed the 
state ideology Pancasila, as the sole foundation of all organizations, 
including mass organizations and political parties. This idea was profoundly 
opposed by Muslims figures, and culminated in the bloody Tanjung Priok 
(North Jakarta) tragedy in 1984 in which hundreds of lives were lost and 
caused injury to many others. Repressive measures from the ruler continued 
until all Muslim organizations had no choice but to accept the ruler’s 
demand. The two largest Muslim organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and 
                                                
3 Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia ( 
New York: Cornell University, 2006), 44. 
4 The term ‘usra’ literally means ‘family’. This method was adopted by the Ikhwanul Muslimin movement 
in Egypt in order to avoid the ruler’s repressive measures on the organization. Usually an usra consists of 5 to 15 
participants under the leadership of na>qib. Indonesian activists learned the method from their counterparts in 
Malaysia, where they had encountered repression from the government. See, Abdul Syukur, “Gerakan Usroh di 
Indonesia, Kasus Peristiwa Lampung 1989,” Master Thesis (Jakarta: Universitas Indonesia, 2001), 41-44.  
5 Interview with AM. Lutfi, Jakarta, September 12, 2008. 
6 Ali Said Damanik, Fenonema Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia 
(Bandung: Teraju, 2002), 68-69. 
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Muhammadiyah, for example, accepted Pancasila as their foundation in 
1984 and 1985, respectively. The reluctant organizations were dissolved. 
Having secured its ideology, the government moved to accommodate 
Muslims’ interests. This tendency was apparent in Suharto’s approval of 
the promulgation of Religious Court in 1989, the launch of the first Islamic 
Bank in Indonesia, the Bank Mu’amalat Indonesia (BMI), and the 
establishment of Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI, Association 
of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals). Suharto himself underwent a 
pilgrimage during this period.  
It was within this socio-political setting of Indonesia that the Salafi 
movement started to surface.  The Salafis began in the late 1980s when 
enthusiasm for studying Islam had grown among university students. As 
Hasan has shown, this enthusiasm provided a fertile soil for Islamic global 
movements such as Ikhwanul Muslimin and Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia.7 
The Salafis targeted the university students in Yogyakarta. It was Abu Nida 
(Chamsaha Shofwan) who initiated the Salafi da’wa among the university 
students. In this initial period, Abu Nida cooperated with some activists of 
Ikhwanul Mulilimin, such as Abu Ridlo, in spreading the Salafi doctrines, 
championing the combined Salafi-Ikhwani slogan “Aqidah Salafi, Manhaj 
Ikhwani” (“Salafi creed, Ikhwani method”).8 Having gained a significant 
number of followers, Abu Nida independently managed his own religious 
circles around Gadjah Mada University, such as at the Mardiyah and 
Mujahidin mosques near the Faculty of Medicine and Faculty of 
Engineering of Gadjah Mada University. In this city, Abu Nida collaborated 
with his companions, Ahmas Faiz Asifuddin and Aunurrafiq Ghufran. Like 
Abu Nida, Asifuddin and Ghufran were the cadres of Dewan Dakwah and 
alumni of the University of Imam Ibn Su’ud in Riyadh. They managed the 
Salafi halqas and dawras in Yogyakarta. The students were also encouraged 
to study Arabic.  
The return of three new graduates, Ja’far Umar Thalib, Yazid Abdul 
Qadir Jawwas and Yusuf Usman Baisa, to Indonesia gave more impetus to 
the Salafi da’wa initiated by Abu Nida. These people were assigned to 
teach at the pesantren al-Irsyad in Tengaran, Salatiga, Central Java. 
Although their presence at the pesantren raised opposition from the existing 
teachers, the Salafi figures successfully changed the pesantren’s orientation 
to Salafism. The pesantren soon became the center of Salafi da’wa, 
attracting many Salafi figures. Many Salafi figures attended the Salafi 
dawras in the pesantren. However, friction emerged among these figures. 
The conflict was triggered by the replacement of Thalib by Baisa as the 
director of the pesantren. Following this replacement, Thalib left the 
                                                
7 Hasan, Laskar Jihad, 45. 
8 Hasan, Laskar Jihad, 52-52. 
THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA: THE CASE OF SALAFI MOVEMENT 
 
ISLAMIKA INDONESIANA, 1:1 (2014) 56 
pesantren and established his own pesantren, Ihya al-Sunna, in Degolan, 
Kaliurang, Yogyakarta in 1994.  
It was from the pesantren al-Irsyad in Tengaran that other Salafi 
pesantrens started to spread across the country. They have emerged in 
several cities in Java and on some of the outer islands. Thus, in West Java 
we find, for example, Minhaj al-Sunnah in Bogor, Ihya’ al-Sunnah in 
Tasikmalaya, Al-Nur al-Atsari in Ciamis, Al-Sunnah and Dhiya’ al-Sunnah 
in Cirebon; in Yogyakarata, we find Ihya al-Sunnah, Anshar al-Sunnah, Bin 
Baz, and Jamilurrahman; in Central Java, we find al-Irsyad in Tengaran, 
Imam Bukhari in Solo; in East Java, we find STAI Ali ibn Abi Thalib in 
Surabaya and al-Furqan in Gresik. In the outer islands we also find Anshar 
al-Sunnah and SDIT Fajar Ilahi in Batam, Kepulauan Riau, Sumatera; in 
South Sulawesi we find Anshar al-Sunnah and Wahdah Islamiyyah in 
Makassar; pesantren Abu Hurairah in West Nusa Tenggara, Lombok island.  
The creation of Forum Komunikasi Ahlusunnah wal Jama’ah 
(FKAWJ, Communication Forum for the Followers of Sunna and Jama’a) in 
1999, followed by its paramilitary wing, the Laskar Jihad, that called 
Muslims for jihad in Ambon and Poso made the conflict between Salafis 
more visible. Although Thalib’s call for jihad was supported by fatwas9 
from many Salafi shaykhs in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, it was sharply 
criticized by his opponents. Asifuddin, for example, criticized the jihad as 
invalid as it deviated from the true Salafi doctrine, arguing that the most 
fundamental doctrine of the Salafi manhaj is obedience to the ruler.10 The 
Laskar Jihad was then dissolved only a few days after the tragedy of the 
first Bali bombings in October 2002. 
The Laskar Jihad’s closure left friction between Thalib and his 
followers. According to his followers, Thalib had deviated from the spirit of 
Laskar Jihad. The case of Kebon Cengkeh, in which the Laskar Jihad had 
confronted the army, resulting in the deaths of many followers of the 
Laskar raised worry among its leading figures. This had showed how the 
Laskar had moved from fighting against non-Muslims to confronting the 
army.11 Thalib was also charged with having gone too far beyond his 
mandate by dispatching the Laskar Jihad to Ngawi, East Java, to deal with 
gambling activities. This action resulted in conflict with both local villagers 
and activists of the political party.12 As a result, Thalib was left by his 
closest comrades, including the Laskar’s vice commander, Muhammad al-
Sewed. Currently, the conflict between them still exists. 
The Salafis have developed some basic ideas. Bernard Haykel 
summarizes those ideas as follows: 1) going back to pristine Islam as 
                                                
9 Ja’far Umar Thalib, “Menepis Rekayasa Fatwa Seputar Jihad di Maluku”, Salafy, 34 (2000), 8-9. 
10 Interview with Ahmas Faiz Asifuddin, director of Pesantren Imam Bukhari, Solo, February 21, 2009.  
11 Interview with Ahmad Halim, former activist of Laskar Jihad, Yogyakarta, January 19, 2009. 
12 http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/2001/12/26/LU/mbm.20011226.LU86755.id.html, accessed on 
April 13, 2011. 
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prescribed in the examples of al-Salaf al-sālih; 2) stressing on certain 
teaching of tawhīd (rubūbiyya, ulūhiyya and al-asmā’ wa al-sifāt); 3) 
fighting shirk (polytheism); 4) declaring that the Qur’an, hadith and the 
consensus of the Companions (ijmā’ al-ṣahaba) are the only valid sources of 
Islamic law; 5) taking away all religious innovations from Muslim 
community; and 6) advocating literal interpretation of the Qur’an and 
hadith to guide Muslims in their life.13 Added to these characteristics is 
absolute honor to the companions. Though the Salafis do not believe in 
their infallibility (ma’ṣūm), the Salafis prohibit Muslim from insulting 
them.14 
 
B.  Salafism and Democracy 
Islam as a comprehensive way of life 
Salafis’ view on the politics derives from their understanding Islam. Unlike 
other groups of Muslims who contend the Islamic doctrines cover aqīda 
(creed) and ibāda (rituals) only, the Salafis believe in comprehensiveness of 
Islam (shumūliyat al-Islam). The Salafis believe that Islam is an all-
encompassing religion that covers all aspects of life: creed, rituals, social 
norms, economics, and politics. This belief is based on the Qur’anic verse 
[5:3] that reads: “This day I have perfected your religion for you, completed 
my favour upon you and have chosen for you Islam as your religion”. Based 
on this Qur’anic verse, the Salafis refute secularism that separates religion 
from politics. According to Salafis, politics is inseparable from religion; the 
politics is a part of religion.15 
 
Theocracy versus Democracy 
Based in this basic doctrine, the Salafis elaborate their theory of power. The 
Salafis believe that the power, governance or political authority belongs to 
God only, and all creatures on the earth, including human beings, must 
submit to God’s law. The task of human beings is to implement God’s law 
as prescribed in the holy Qur’an and hadith. Human beings have no right to 
create new laws contradicting to divine law. This view is based on the the 
Qur’anic verse [3:26] that reads:16  
“Say: Oh Allah! Lord of power (and rule), Thou givest power to 
whom Thou pleasest, and Thou strippest off power from whom 
Thou pleasest. Thou endues with honour whom Thou pleasest, 
and Thou bringest low whom Thou pleasest. In Thy hand is all 
good. Verily, over all things Thou hast power”. 
                                                
13 Bernard Haykel, “On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action”, Global Salafism, ed. Roel Meijer 
(London: Hurst and Company, 2009), 38-39.   
14 Interview with Aunurrafiq Ghufran, director of pesantren al-Furqan, Gresik, 26 December 2009.  
15 Muhammad Umat As-Sewed, “Islam Mengatur Sistem Negara”, Salafy, 40 (2001), 13. 
16 Thalib, “Menyoal Demokrasi”, Salafy, 30 (1999), 4.  
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This means that, according to Salafism, Islam does not support democracy 
but theocracy. In another words, Islam is incompatible with democracy. 
According to this theocracy, the human beings’ power derives from God’s 
power, and then God endows His power to elected people in order to govern 
the earth according to His laws. This doctrine brings about some 
consequences: human beings are not allowed to create any law 
contradicting to His laws; the ruler has to implement God’s laws prescribed 
in the holy Qur’an and hadiths; the ruler is not allowed to surrender to the 
will of majority, since the majority can mislead and deviate from the truth. 
The truth, according to Salafis belongs to God, and the task of the ruler is 
to maintain this truth.  Here, the Salafis reject the slogan of democracy that 
equates “people’s will” to “God’s will”.  
 One of crucial issue dealing with democracy is general election as a 
method of assigning the ruler. In democratic countries, including Indonesia, 
general election is considered as the best way to elect the rulers: president, 
governors, majors, and people representatives. The question is how Salafis 
choose the ruler. In line with notion of theocratic system, Salafis do not 
support the general elections. They argue general election as a 
manifestation of democratic system considers the quantity of the people 
only, and at the same time, ignores their quality. In democracy, the value of 
kyai, for example, is the same as that of prostitute, because they have 
similar vote, one vote. 
 Rejecting general election as a method of appointing the ruler, the 
Salafis proposes another mechanism, by establishing the ahl al-ḥall wa al-
‘aqd (people who loose and bind). The ahl al-ḥall wa al-‘aqd consists of 
knowledgeable people in different fields: religion, defense, politics, 
economics, social, and cultures. It is not clear how Salafis select people to 
become members of the ahl al-ḥall wa al-‘aqd. However, once the members 
of the ahl al-ḥall wa al-‘aqd are selected, they have crucial task to appoint 
the ruler. When the ruler deviates from the right track, the member of the 
ahl al-ḥall wa al-‘aqd also have right to replace the ruler with another. Thus, 
according to Salafis, it is not the people who appoint and depose their ruler, 
but the ahl al-ḥall wa al-‘aqd. Through this mechanism, not all people 
participate in process of the election of the ruler.17 Because of this believe, 
the Salafis do not go to the poll to vote.  
The concept of the ahl al-ḥall wa al-‘aqd proposed by Salafis makes 
a clear distinction between democracy and shūra> (consultation). While 
many Muslims believe that shūra> is similar to democracy, the Salafis argue 
they are different. Democracy engages all people to take part in the process 
of the selection, while shūra> involve few people only.  
                                                
17 Thalib, “Menyoal Demokrasi”, 6. 
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 Furthermore, the Salafis elaborate damage caused by general 
election. The damage, among other things, includes:18 
1. General election is considered as an act of polytheism, because it 
creates a new idol, the majority of the voters. Moreover, it also 
makes new legislation on the basis of the majority, while in Islam, 
the legislator is God. 
2. General election leads Muslims to disregard the doctrine of al-walā’ 
wa al-barā’ (loyalty and disavowal). The doctrine suggests Muslims 
to love their fellow Muslims and hate non-Muslims and work for the 
sake of God and His Messenger. While in the general election, 
Muslims work together with non-Muslim to choose and decide their 
representatives and ruler. 
3. In some cases, general election is supported by funds from Western 
countries (the Jews and Christians), in order to infiltrate their 
interest. 
4. People engaged in the general election in fact insults Islam because 
they give non-Muslims opportunity to accuse Islam of being 
incomplete as it has no doctrine to create a just and prosperous 
society.  
5. General election creates money politics, which is not allowed in 
Islam. 
6. General election fragments Muslims, and creates h}izbiyyah or 
fanaticism to party and leader, while Islam teaches Muslims to show 
their love to the prophet.   
  
Obedience to the ruler 
Although not agreed to by all Salafis, the doctrine of people’s obedience to 
the ruler is a pivotal Salafi doctrine in relation to Muslims’ attitudes 
towards the government. The idea of submission to the government is 
almost absolute and can only be ignored for very fundamental reason of 
faith. There is, no doubt, a small group of Salafis who object to this 
doctrine and who support the takfīr idea as discussed above. This objection, 
however, does not detract from the significance of the dominant Salafi 
doctrine concerning allegiance to the ruler. Madawi al-Rasheed has noted 
that in Saudi Arabia, the doctrine of obedience to the ruler dates back to 
1929 after the ikhwan’s rebellion against the Saudi ruler, Abd al-Aziz ibn 
Su’ud. Ibn Su’ud defeated his own rebellious comrades in the battle of al-
Sibla and repelled them to the neighboring Gulf states, which were under 
British rule. Soon after quelling the rebellion, the Saudi clerics developed 
the doctrine of obedience to the ruler in the home country. Any attempt to 
                                                
18 Muhammad Umar As-Sewed, “Beberapa Kursakan Pemilu”, Salafy, 30 (1999), 8-15. 
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oppose him was deemed khurūj ‘alā al-hākim, rebellion against the ruler.19 
This doctrine of loyalty is supported by many dalīls from the Qur’an, the 
prophetic tradition and the examples of the pious predecessors, the al-Salaf 
al-ṣalih.  
In Salafi doctrine, Qur’anic verse 4: 59 contains the main argument 
for the submission to the government. This verse states that Muslims 
should obey God, the Messenger and their rulers (wali> al-amr). Both 
government and ‘ulama are included in the category of ‘ruler’.20 Another 
Qur’anic injunction, verse 4: 83, tells us that Muslims should always refer 
back to the prophet and the ruler. Unlike the submission to God and His 
messenger, which are absolute, obedience to the ruler is conditional in so 
far as a ruler’s command does not contradict the commands of God. Should 
the ruler command his people to commit sinful acts, however, Muslims are 
told they are not allowed to execute his order.21 
In addition to the above reference, there are a number of prophetic 
sayings that command Muslims to obey a ruler and not to rebel against him 
even in cases where he is a tyrant, repressive or acts like the devil.22 The 
prophet relates submission to the ruler to submission to himself: loyalty to 
the ruler equates devotion to the prophet.23 The prophet also tells that a 
Muslim who dies being disloyal to the government dies in a state of 
jāhiliyyah (as if in the age of ignorance), as according to Ibn Taymiyya, 
rebellion against the ruler is a jāhiliyyah tradition. However, Salafis follow 
the example of the pious predecessors and quote the story of Ah}mad ibn 
H{anbal who, despite being tortured by his ruler, remained loyal to him.24 
With reference to the sources mentioned above, Salafis contend that 
Muslims are not allowed to rebel against a ruler as long as he allows 
Muslims to perform their religious duties, such as performing the five 
prayers, fasting during Ramadan, and paying alms. There are only two 
conditions that permit Muslims to rebel: if a ruler demonstrates his kufr 
(unbelief in God) and if he does not perform his prayers.25 However, it is a 
complicated matter to decide whether or not a ruler is a kāfir (unbeliever). 
This status cannot be indicated by his sayings alone because his sayings and 
his acts may not constitute the essence of his belief. Furthermore, a ruler’s 
                                                
19 Madawi Al-Rasheed, “The Minaret and The Palace: Obedience at Home and Rebellion Abroad”, Kingdom 
without Borders, ed. Madawi al-Rasheed (London: Hurst and Company, 2008), 203. 
20 In spite of the minor difference in interpreting the term “waliyy al-amr minkum” (ruler from you), the 
Salafis agree that the term includes the ruler and the ‘ulama>. See, “Kewajiban Mentaati Penguasa dalam Perkara 
yang Baik (Tafsir Surat An-Nisa’ 59)”, Salafy, 5:7 (2005), 44-46. 
21 Abu Abd al-Rahman Fauzi al-Atsari, Meredam Amarah terhadap Pemerintah (Pekalongan: Pustaka 
Sumayya, 2005), 49. 
22 A famous hadith from Hudhaifa ibn Yaman says that a Muslim should listen to and obey his ruler even if 
the ruler intimidates him and appropriates his wealth. The hadith is narrated in the two foremost reliable hadith 
books of S{ah}i>h al-Bukha>ri> and S{ah}i>h Muslim. See al-Atsari, Meredam Amarah, 56. 
23 Al-Atsari, Meredam Amarah. 53. See also Yazi>d bin ‘Abd al-Qadi>r Jawa>s, Syarah Aqidah Ahlus Sunnah 
wal Jama’ah (Bogor: Pustaka Imam Syafi’i, 2006), 573. 
24 Al-Atsari, Meredam Amarah, 68. 
25 See “Akhlak Kaum Muslimin Menghadapi Penguasa yang Dhalim,” Salafy, 5:7 (2008), 60.  
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tyrannical and evil acts cannot make him a kāfir. It is the duty of hadith 
‘ulama to decide whether or not a ruler may remain Muslim; ordinary 
people cannot accuse a ruler of being kāfir.26 
Salafis believe that fighting a Muslim ruler will result in more 
damage than the ruler himself ever could do.27 This appears to contradict 
the principle of commanding right and forbidding evil but Salafis argue that 
evil cannot be eliminated though committing other evil acts. Moreover, 
when applying the principle the potential gains and damages should be 
measured. In fact, Salafis have developed various guidelines for its 
implementation: first, if the application of commanding right and 
forbidding wrong outweighs the damage its application would cause, then it 
is demanded by religion. Second, and by contrast, if the application of the 
principle creates more damage than benefit, it is considered unlawful. 
Third, if the benefit is equal to the damage, the application of the principle 
is neither demanded nor prohibited so it is permissible. These guidelines are 
in line with the more general principle in Islam of “avoiding damage is 
preferable to acquiring benefit.”28  
The Salafis have set up practical guidelines for the relationship 
between the ruler and the ruled: Muslims must honour the ruler, not 
criticize him publicly and not speak about his weaknesses. In addition, 
rather than advising a ruler in the public space, Muslims are required to 
advise him covertly. Muslims are obliged to display their support for their 
ruler by performing their religious duties such as paying alms (zakāt), 
performing the pilgrimage and waging jihad.29 It should be noted that for 
Salafis, jihad is only valid if instructed by a legitimate imam. Muslims 
should also abide by the government’s decision concerning the arrival of 
Ramadan and the dates of the festivals of Īd al-Fiṭr and Īd al-Aḍḥā.30 As it 
happens, these important Islamic events have been the cause of recurrent 
disagreement among Indonesian Muslims. For many years, Muslims have 
used different methods to decide when the beginning of Ramadan should 
be. Similarly, different Muslims have celebrated Īd al-Fiṭr on different days. 
In order to avoid this kind of disagreement, Salafis opt to follow the 
Indonesian government’s decision when Id al-Fiṭr should be celebrated, and 
they follow the decision of the Saudi government when the festival of Īd al-
Adha should be held. In the last case, they argue that the celebration of Īd 
al-Adha relates to the ritual enacted during the pilgrimage, which is 
performed in Saudi Arabia and thus the Saudi Government should decide 
                                                
26 Ja’far Umar Thalib, “Sikap Politik Ahlus Sunnah”, Laskar Jihad, 20 (June 2002), 5. Also, interview with 
Ahmas Faiz Asifuddin, the director of pesantren Imam Bukhari, Solo, February 21, 2009. 
27 Jawas, Syarah ‘Aqidah, p 573. 
28 Yazid bin Abdul Qadir Jawas, Amar Ma‘ruf Nahi Munkar Menurut Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama’ah (Bogor: 
Pustaka At-Taqwa, 2009), 214-225. 
29 Al-Rasheed, “The Minaret and The Palace,” 205. 
30 Al-Atsari, Meredam Amarah, 232-246. 
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when the ritual should be held. Īd al-Adha occurs on the 10th of Dhulhijja, 
the last month of the Islamic calendar when large numbers of Muslims from 
all over the world perform the pilgrimage. The pilgrims gather in ‘Arafa to 
perform the wuqūf, one of the hajj rituals on the 9th of Dhulhijjah or one day 
before the celebration of Īd al-Adha. As the wuqūf is held in Saudi Arabia, 
the Saudi government has the authority to decide on its date.31  
To participate in demonstrations is perceived as bid’a. It contradicts 
the general principle that evil cannot be countered by another evil. Usually, 
demonstrations involve both women and men and this mixing of the sexes 
is not allowed. Moreover, large crowds may be seen as a possible catalyst 
and provoke other followers to act violently and to rebel against the 
legitimate ruler. For Salafis, participants in demonstrations find it difficult 
to control their statements and acts, which may humiliate the government 
and result in damage.32  
 
CONCLUSION 
Although the majority of Muslims in Indonesia endorse democracy, there is 
small number of Muslims who reject democracy on the basis of religious 
doctrines. As conceived by Salafis, democracy is against Islam, and 
therefore Islam is incompatible with democracy. However small number of 
them reduces people’s participation in democracy. In an era of political 
literate, religious-based opposition to democracy is more dangerous than 
opposition based on other reasons. However, Salafis are inconsistent in 
their opposition to democracy by introducing their doctrine of loyalty to 
the ruler. Once the ruler comes into power, regardless his method in 
obtaining the power (general election, and hence, democracy), the ruled has 
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